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Glenn E. Coven is a Professor o f Law at the 
Marsha ll -Wythe School o f Law, Co llege of William 
and Mary. 
In this artic le, Coven points out that the Subchap-
te r S provision of the Code prescribes very detai led 
procedura l rules that produce unintended resu lts 
from time to time. The Interna l Revenue Service has 
responded in some instances by a very liberal 
ru ling policy relieving the hardsh ip. Th is te nds to 
make the rea l law of Subchapter S different from 
the apparent law. He thinks that the statutory restric -
tions are attributable to the re latively low tax cost of 
moving in and out of Subchapter S for corporations 
that have accumulated earnings. In an S co rpora-
tion, income earned by prior accumulated profi ts 
can escape the corporate tax although it has not 
previously been subjec ted to shareholder tax. He 
proposes th at the definition of an S corporation be 
greatly libera l ized for corporations lacking earn ings 
and profits. 
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Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code continues 
to i llustrate the enormous gu lf that too often exists be-
tween a good , simp le idea and its statutory express ion. 
The provision was designed to permit the incorporation 
of small businesses without subject ing the ir owners to 
the burden of doub le taxat ion-or, more accurate ly , to 
the need to engage in soph ist icated tax planning to avo id 
that tax . Subchapter S, however, has never fulf ill ed that 
promise . The combinat ion of hi gh ly restr ict ive def init iona l 
limitations, exacting procedural requirements, and defec-
tive substantive prov isions has caused the use of the 
Subch apter S corporation to be far more co mplex and 
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expens ive-and dangerous-than the use of either part-
nerships or regu lar corporatio ns. 
If the maxi mum rate of tax app li cab le to ind ividua l 
taxpayers is reduced in accordance with the current 
leg islative proposals, the popularity of the recent ly re-
named S corporation shou ld increase signif icantly. In-
deed, if the maximum ind ividual rate is reduced relative 
to the max imum corporate rate as proposed in the Sen-
ate,' the use of S corporat ions undoubted ly wi ll increase 
dramaticall y. This expanded use of S corporations by 
taxpayers whose tax advisors lack experience with Sub-
chapter S enhances the importance of rat ionalizing the 
taxation of this form of investment vehic le. 
A. An Unfinished Revision 
Afte r nearly a quarter of a century of strugg ling with 
the consequences of the orig ina l version of Subchapter 
S, in 1982 the Congress enacted the Subchapter S 
Revi sion Act.2 In an effort to elim inate the absurd inequi-
ties that permeated that first attempt to extend conduit 
taxation to incorporated small businesses, the system for 
tax ing income derived by an S corporation , and distribu-
t ions from such a corporat ion , was thorough ly revi sed . 
While those prov isions are far from perfected, the solu-
tions contained in the Revision Act greatly rationalized 
the substant ive prov isions of Subchapter S. 
Congress' clear intention was to make Sub-
chapter S 'user friendly.' 
The definitional and procedural requirements of Sub-
chapter S, however, were little changed in 1982. Perhaps 
because those features of Subchapter S had been re-
peatedly amended in prior years and their most egregious 
faults eliminated," the 1982 rev ision addressed the sub-
stant ive prov isions almost exc lusively. As a result, eligi -
'See Joint Committee on Ta xat ion, Summary of the Tax 
Refo rm Provisions in H.R. 3838 as Ordered Reported by the 
Senate Co mmittee on Finance, May 12, 1986, reprinted in Tax 
Notes, May 19,1986, p. 699 . 
2Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669. 
' For a br ief history of the evolut ion of these provisi ons, see 
Coven and Hess, The Subchapter Rev isions Act : An Analysis 
and App ra isal, 50 Tenn. L. Rev. 569 (1 983 ). 
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that such a trust can be a shareho lder for 60 days but 
on ly if it receives the S co rporati on stock pursuant to a 
will. In that event, the trust is a rea l shareholder of the 
corporation for all purposes for that brief period . But 
what if the stock is retained beyond 60 days? If the 
retention proceeds from ignorance, at least , it may pro-
duce an inadvertent terminat ion in which event the t rust 
may still be recog nized as a shareho lder for a period of 
seve ral months, or perhaps more. Or, what if th e t rust 
acqui red its stock in some other man ner? Aga in, inadver-
tent termination relief may be availab le. For income 
repo rting purposes, during this undefined period the 
trust wi ll be treated as a true shareho lder. For other 
purposes, such as co nsent ing to a revocat ion of the 
elect ion, its status is unresolved . 
The dichotomy between the 'real' law of Sub-
chapter S and the law as it appears from the 
Code is substantial and increasing. 
Even if the transfer to the trust is qu ite de liberate, the 
trust may nonetheless sti ll be treated as a permissib le 
shareholder- for at least some purposes. Thus, for per-
haps one or two months, such a trans itory trust might be 
" ignored." Whether such an ignored trust must report in-
come or can consent to elect ion s is wholly unreso lved . It 
does appear, however, that an ignored tru st may own 
stock on the day the election is f il ed without destroy ing 
the va lid ity of the elect ion . 
However, if this deliberate trust owned stock on the day 
the elect ion was fi led and the ho ld ing persisted for more 
than a trans itory period, it w ill not be recognized as a 
shareho lder and the S elect ion wil l not be effective-
unless , of cou rse, the trust meets th e requirements for a 
qua li f ied Subchapter S tru st . In that event, the faulty 
elect ion will be treated as a termin at ion and the trust ca n 
be recognized as a shareholder. 
These impropriet ies under Subchapter S are not attribu-
table to the Se rvi ce's having ruled inappropriately but 
rather to the inherent ly inconsistent def in itiona l and 
procedural prov isions that Congress inserted into Sub-
chapter S. The reasoning of these private ru l ings is 
dub ious but the resu lts obtained are ent irely cons istent 
with soun d tax poli cy. Congress left the Interna l Revenue 
Serv ice with the task of reconci ling a generally restrict ive 
statutory framework with the liberalizing amendments 
added in 1982. It is hardly unreasonable for the Se rv ice to 
co nclude that it co uld not grant reli ef to acc idental 
terminations of elections but deny relief to fau lty elect ions 
that involved ind istinguishab le errors. 
The Se rvi ce cannot succeed in sat isfactori ly reconciling 
these co ntrad icto ry themes and the effort to do so wi ll 
inevitab ly be cou nte rproductive to the overal l objective of 
minimizing the complexity and obscurity of Subchapter 
S. The conseq uences of this liberalizing series of private 
rulin gs has been to leave the state of the law in a far 
diffe rent posture from what mi ght be supposed from a 
reading of the highly restrictive provisions of the Code . 
At the moment, the ve ry ex istence of these libera lizing 
rul es is known on ly to the relat ively few pract it ioners that 
follow the private rulings. Even when regu lations are 
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iss ued , they are un l ikely to embody all of the remed ial 
po licies ref lected in the current ru lings . As suggested 
above, the prec ise scope of the transitory shareholder 
ru le is l ikely to rem ain unclear for decades . 
Even if the rules and procedures under Subchapte r S 
are ult imate ly estab li shed , those rules wil l necessaril y be 
interna lly inconsistent in both spirit and result. Since 
so me statuto ry provision s cannot be modified, inflex ible 
and rest r ictive ru les w ill co-ex ist w ith th e broad ly reme-
dial. As a resu lt , it wi ll be d ifficult for pract it ioners to 
obtain a " fee l" for the provisions of Subchapter S. More-
over, the substantive result of these rul es will appear, and 
often may be, unfair as instances of sweep ing re li ef 
co ntrast with oppress ive results reached in seeming ly 
simi lar c ircu mstances. An d finally, the attempt to recon-
c il e incons istent rul es cannot avoid produc ing complex 
and d iff icult to comprehend regu latory p rovis ions . T hus , 
the inc idence of taxpaye r error wi ll remain hi gh notwith-
standing the Service's attempt to proceed as f lexibly as a 
broad construction of the Code permits. 
For these reasons, it is not sat isfactory to attempt to 
rat iona lize the defi nitiona l and procedura l prov isio ns of 
Subchapter S through the rulings and regulations pro-
cess . As recent rulings illustrate, considerab le effort will 
be required to reconci le these provis ions . U ndoubtedly, 
even greate r effort w il l be requ ired to prod uce ratio nal 
and cons istent regu lations. That effort wo u ld be better 
spent in revising the Code prov isions themselves by 
eli min at ing the oppress ive remnants of the orig inal leg is-
lati on and cons istent ly extending th e phi losophy of t he 
1982 amendments. Wh at is required to permit Subchapter 
S to fulfill its promise is a co mprehensive rev ision of t he 
statutory prov isions them selves. 
The reasoning of these private rulings is du-
bious, but the results obtained are entirely 
consistent with sound tax policy. 
2. The Effective Date of the Election: the Price of 
Stinginess. The f law in the provisions of Subchapter S 
that govern the effecti ve date of the election is best 
understood, oddly enough , by exam ining the provis ions 
that contro l the effective date of the term ination of 
Subchapter S elect ion s. Under the ru les in effect pr ior to 
1982, the termination of a Subchapter S election cou ld 
occur on ly as of th e end of a taxab le year . Moreover, if 
th e terminat ion were by a vo luntary revocation, the ter-
minat ion co uld on ly be prospective'6 That li m itation was 
unsatisfactory to many S co rporation shareholders who 
discovered during a taxab le year that chang ing circum-
stances had left the ir elect ion unattractive. 
Fo rtun ate ly, a so lution was at hand . If the elect ion 
terminated involuntarily-because the corporation no 
longer met the definitional requirements for electing S 
status-the te rminat ion was retroactive to the beg inning 
of the taxab le year . Th e other side of st r ict def in itional 
requirements was that it was terr ibly simple to fail the 
!6Former I. R.C. sect ion 1372(e)(2) . 
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defi ni t io nal tests by des ign . As a result , the standard 
procedure fo r term inat ing an unwanted S electi on was to 
transfer stock in t he co rporat io n to an impermi ss ible 
shareho lder suc h as the co rpo rate atto rney's profess ional 
co rpo rat ion . 
Th at into lerab ly r id ic u lous statuto ry pattern was eli mi-
nated in th e Revision Act thro ug h the adm irab ly simpl e 
technique of d ispe nsin g w ith t he requirement of yea r-end 
term inati ons . Under c u rrent law, invo luntary terminati ons 
are effect ive on th e day that the d isqualify in g event 
occ urs,17 and vo luntary te rminat ions may be effective on 
any prospect ive day spec if ied by the shareho lders. ' s As a 
res ul t , S corpo rati ons no long er have the ab il ity to ret ro-
act ive ly te rminate their statu s and their shareho lders are 
no lo nger req ui red to engage in meanin g less t ransfers to 
avo id th e deferral o f t heir revocat io n to the end of th e 
yea r. 
S corporations no longer have the ability to 
retroactively terminate their status. 
Th at substant ial improve ment in th e rationali ty of th e 
procedures governin g the term inat ion of S elect ions was 
ach ieved at onl y a min imal in c rease in the comp lex ity of 
the substant ive prov isio ns o f Subc hapter S. Perm itting 
m id -yea r term inat ion s req uired that th e incom e fo r th e 
yea r o f termination be allocated between the short period s 
preceding and foll owin g th e term inati on. ' 9 Such an all o-
ca ti on, ho weve r, must a lso be made in any year in which 
sto c k in an S co rporat io n is transferred to ensure th at the 
transferor and t ransferee are appropriately taxed. Thus 
the need for an al locati o n in the yea r of term ination d id 
not in ject a nove l requ irement into the taxat ion of S 
co rporat ions. Mo reover, th e adm inistrat ive burden of 
mak ing income all ocati o ns was lesse ned by permittin g 
the inco me fo r the te rminat io n yea r to be pro rated over 
the ent ire yea r.20 Th e ex pense and inconvenience o f an 
in te r im c los in g of t he books t hu s cou ld be avo ided if th e 
parties so des ired . 
Unfo rtunately, the ru les govern ing the making of elec -
t io ns were not simi la rl y rat ion alized . Rather, the requ ire-
ment of th e o r ig in al Subchapter S that elections becom e 
effec t ive on ly at the beg inning of a taxab le yea r was 
retained.21 Whi le th at li mitati o n may appear harm less 
eno ugh , altho ugh need less ly rest r ict ive, in fad it con -
tri butes to a surprising deg ree to the excess ive ly techn ica l 
and sl ig ht ly irrat io nal nature of Subc hapter S. 
(a) Since the defin it ion al requirements for electing 
Subchapter S stat us remain t ight ly def ined and the pro-
ced ural requirements hi g h ly tec hn ica l, it co nt inues to be 
far too easy to make an inva lid e lect io n. And, because th e 
elect ion ca n be effect ive only as of the beginning of the 
taxab le year, the cost o f that fa i lure can be excess ively 
" !.R.C. sect ion 1362(d)(2)( B). 
,s !.RC . secti on 1362(d )( 1)( O). 
" I.R.C. sect ion 1362(e). 
,o !.R.C. section 1362(e)(2) . 
" !.R .C. sect ion 1362(c). 
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great: the loss of Subc hapter S status for an entire year. 
As a result, a d isp roport ionate importa nce attac hes to 
com pli ance w ith a long se ries of high ly tec hni ca l re-
qu irements. 22 
Enormous stress is placed upon the definitions 
contained in these procedural rules. 
Beca use tax paye rs have only one opportunity in a year 
to elec t Subchapte r S status, enorm ous stress is placed 
upon the defin iti ons co ntained in these proced ural ru les. 
Quite mea ning less questions, such as the day on which a 
co rporat ion is dee med to f irst have shareholders under 
state law,23 assume undue signi ficance. Two quite co n-
fl icting co nsequences have resu lted f ro m the importance 
attac hed to these technica l requirements. Most obv iously, 
many taxpayers have been denied Subchapte r S status 
for t heir corp orat ions fo r an entire yea r, o r more, beca use 
of hi gh ly tec hnica l defects in the election process . Th ose 
results, whi le perh aps unavoidable under the tech ni ca l 
language of the statute, are nevertheless inconsisten t 
w ith the more general co ngress ional desire to elim inate 
need less "t raps for the unwa ry" in the ad min istrat ion of 
Subchapter S. 
On the oth er hand, because these technica lly inva l id 
e lect ion s are c lea rly in co mpatible with so und tax po li cy , 
the Servi ce has freq uent ly sought to avo id those resul ts 
throug h unusually liberal co nstruct ions of the statutory 
requirements. As described above, pr ivate rulin gs have 
been iss ued in wh ich impe rmi ss ib le shareholde rs have 
been igno red beca use they we re " transito ry" and in 
which a QSST t ru st was treated as a permitted sha re-
holder even though the benefic iary had failed to elec t 
that statu s. 
If the Congress had extend ed to the making of S 
elect ions the sa me f lex ib ility that it extended to the 
2'For a sa mpli ng of the ancillary ru les that co mplicate com pli-
ance with the provisions that govern the t ime in which elections 
must be fi led, the following exa mples may suff ice . The Code 
permits the electi on to be made prospectively or during the first 
two and one-half months of the year for which it is to be 
effective. However, the Code appears to requ ire that the corpo-
ration meet the definit ional requirements on the day that it fil es 
its electi on even though the elect ion is not to become effect ive 
fo r severa l monlil s. Moreover, if the co rporat ion is elect ing 
du ring the two and one-half month grace peri od, those require-
ments must be met during the portion of the year preced ing the 
electi on and all shareholders during that pre-elect ion peri od 
must consent to the election even if they no longer own any 
stock on the day the elect ion is made. If one of the shareholders 
is a qualified Subchapter S tru st, the benefi ciary of the trust 
must not only consent to the electi on but must also elect QSST 
status for his trust. all within the grace period. And the corpora-
ti on must use the ca lendar year or a year having a bus iness 
purpose or its election wi ll not be va lid. 
" The grace period for electing beg ins to run when the corpo-
rat ion first has assets, shareholders, or beg ins business. Rev. 
Rul. 72-257, 1972-1 C.B. 270, held that the period began to run 
on the date of incorporation because under state law, in the 
abse nce of actua l stock holders, the subscri bers to stock were 
treated as shareholders. 
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revok ing of elections, the st ress on the statutory defini-
tions wou ld have bee n avoided and the res ult ing distortion 
of the statu tory language unnecessa ry . If, for example, 
the ex iste nce of a co rporate shareho lder on the first day 
of a taxable year only meant that the elec tion would 
become effect ive on the fo ll owing day, it p lain ly wou ld be 
unnecessa ry to evo lve rules permitting and defining tran-
sitory shareho lders . 
Such a rul e might permit furth er si mpl ifi cations. More 
f lex ible elections would make it unnecessa ry to permit 
retroactive elections during a grace period. The series of 
ru les defin ing the grace period and the effect of an inva l id 
retroact ive election during the grace period could be 
eliminated . 
(b) Subchapter S does not co nta in any concept of 
change of corpo rate ownership. Rather , the traditional 
concept of the separate entity of the corpo ration prevail s. 
If a ll of th e stock of a corporation is purchased in the 
midd le of a year, the en tirely new shareho lder group is no 
more able to elect under Subchapter S prior to the end of 
the year than were th e se l lers. T hat resul t is p lain ly 
inappropriate. 
There is no obvious reason why a corporation 
should be permitted to make a one-day election 
for the purpose of passing an extraordinary 
loss through to its shareholders. 
The broader picture, however, is even worse for in th is 
area, too, the Serv ice has attempted to avo id harsh 
results through liberal ru lings when so me bas is for that 
f lexibility was prese nted . And , as before, that liberality 
has created a less than rat iona l pattern of sometimes 
harsh , so metimes li bera l rul es . If the purchasi ng share-
holders have the good fortune to purchase the stock of a 
co rporation from a corporat ion that had been fi ling a 
consol idated ret urn, the S election may be mad e imm e-
diately. It see ms that under the consol idated return 
regu lations, the short period commencing w ith the decon-
so l idat ion of a subsidiary is treated as a separate taxab le 
year.24 For that h igh ly tec hn ica l reason, the Se rvi ce has 
repeatedly ru led that such an acqu ired corporation may 
fi le a S elect ion with in the grace period that beg ins w ith 
the fi rst day of that short year.25 
Needless, perhaps, to observe, the ability to elect under 
Subchapter S shou ld not turn on the fortu ity of a stock 
purchase from a conso lidated group. A more f lexible 
elect ion procedure wou ld avoid that d iscontinuity. 
(c) In one respec t, the f lex ib ili ty of the revocat ion ru le 
is too liberal. There is no obvious rea so n why a corpora-
tion should be permitted to make a one-day election for 
the purpose of pass ing an extraord ina ry loss through to 
its shareholders. A more f lexib le election procedure wou ld 
aggravate that possibi li ty for it would become easier for a 
corpora t ion to elect S treatment for the per iod of t i me in 
which it was accomp lish ing a fu ll or partial l iquidation of 
its assets. 
'''Regs. sect ion 1.1S02-76(d ). 
" E.g ., PLR 8443039 (Ju l. 23,1984) . 
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Rega rd less of whether the election or the revocation 
occurs in mid-year, Subchapte r S elections by prev io usly 
nonelect ing, o r "C" corporat ions, for a pe riod shorter 
than, say , one year shou ld not be perm itted . Wh il e that 
requirement could be imposed in a variety of ways, it 
wou ld see m appropriate to simp ly bar Subc hapte r S 
t rea tment for any period to a corporat io n that had ever 
been a nonelect ing corporation if any form of term in ation 
of S status occurs within a prescribed period o f t ime 
fo llowing the elect ion . 
3. The Qualified Subchapter S Trust: The Futility of 
Stinginess. Th is third exa mple of the te nsio n betwee n 
rigidi ty and f lex ib ility in the procedura l requ ireme nts o f 
Subc hapte r S il lust ra tes a somewhat different point. For 
better or worse, Subcrlapter S is a part o f o ur Intern al 
Revenue Code. The Congress cannot simu ltaneously 
make Subchapter S useful and in sulate it from the carnival 
of tax plann ing that occurs eve ryw here else. 
The most libe ra l prov ision in the def init io n of a small 
business corporatio n is the one permitt ing qualified Sub-
chapter S trusts to be shareho lders. But the definit ion of 
a QSST is quite narrow ly def ined .26 The entire economic 
interest in such a trust must belong to a single beneficiary 
for th e duration of the benefic iary's l ife or the sho rter 
term of the trust. The ben eficiary's income interest cannot 
earli er terminate and any d istributions of income or 
corpu s must be to that benef iciary. Fina lly, all o f the 
f iduci ary accounting income of the t rust must be cu rrently 
distributed, or required to be d istributed, to that benefi-
c iary. 
It is thus quite c lea r that if a shareho lder o f an S co rpo-
ration placed some of his stock ina trust for the benefit of 
a minor chi ld, the trust wou ld not be a q ua lifi ed Sub-
chapter S trust if the term s o f t he trust were as fo ll ows: 
the trust is to last for 11 years ; all of the trust income is to 
be accumulated; the independent trustee may make co r-
pus distributions to the sister of the income be nef iciary; 
and, upon the termination of the trust, al l of its assets, 
inc lud ing the accumu lated income, wou ld revert to the 
c reator o f the trust. Nevertheless, such a trust co u Id be a 
permissib le shareholder of an S co rporation . 
Grantor trusts are also permissible share-
holders of S corporations. 
Grantor trusts are also permiss ib le shareholders of S 
corporat ions, provided that all of the trust is treated 
under the C liffo rd provis ions as owned by " an ind ividua l. " 
That permission extends to section 678 trusts . Under that 
sec t ion, one other than the c reator of the t rust may be 
treated as the owner of the trust if he has the unilatera l 
power to vest the income (or the co rpus) of the trust in 
h imse lf . If such a power ex ists over all of the income of 
the trust , section 678 treats the power holder as the 
own er of the entire trust for the purpose of taxi ng him on 
the trust income- notwithstandi ng that the corpus of the 
trust may be distributed to another or may reve rt to the 
creator of the trust. 
'· I.R.C. sect ion 136 1 (d)(3) . 
TAX NOTES, July 21,1986 
Notwit hstanding this treatment of the power ho lde r as 
the owner of the ent ire trust for t hese income tax pur-
poses, it might be argued that the trust described above 
neve rthe less was not a perm issib le sharehol der of an S 
co rporation because the benef iciary did not in fact own 
the enti re t rust w ith in the mean ing of sect ion 1361 (c) 
(2)(A)( i). That sect ion, however, only req ui res that the 
trust be t reated as owned by a sing le ind ividual and that 
sect ion 678 does. Accord ing ly , t he Se rvice has ru led 
privately that a short term sect ion 678 trust may be a 
permiss ible share ho lder of an S corporat ion.27 
Of course, to obta in sect ion 678 treatme nt, the be ne-
f iciary must have the power to withdraw all of the income 
of the trust cu rrent ly. Bu t the " income" that the power 
ho lde r has the ri ght to withdraw can on ly be the " income" 
that the trust has ava il ab le to d istr ibu te . If the on ly asset 
of the trust is stock in an S corporat ion, that " income" 
ca n o nl y extend to d istribut ions from the corporation-
and not to the taxab le income of the S corporat ion that is 
all ocab le to the trust. Thus, if the S corporat ion does not 
make any d istributions, t here w i ll be nothing for the 
power ho lder to w ithd raw upon the annual exerc ise of h is 
right. And, if the ba lance of the stock is owned indiv idually 
by the creator of the trust or members of his fam il y , the 
mak ing or not of distr ibut ions can be ent ire ly contro lled. 
As a result, it is ent ire ly poss ible to g ive t he income 
benef iciary a r ight to demand the d istribut ion of all t rust 
income but to ensure that no economic benef it w ill eve r 
be obta ined by the benef ic iary. Upon the conclus ion of 
the trust term, the corpus of the trust, stock in the S 
corporat ion- includ ing the increase in va lue that has 
bee n taxed to the income benefi ciary of the trust under 
sect ion 678-will revert to the creator. 
The attempt to isolate it from tax planning has 
left Subchapter S unusable in too many legiti-
mate contexts. 
If such a short te rm t rust is in fact a permissib le share-
ho lder of an S corporat ion, t here wi ll be few instances in 
whic h it w ill be necessary to use the tight ly restricted 
qualif ied Subchapter S trust. The section 678 trust is a far 
mo re f lex ib le veh ic le. That observat ion brings us to the 
point of this example. 
In either its present form or the modest ly simp lifi ed 
vers ion cur rent ly being cons idered in Cong ress, the 
Code is an enormously comp li cated body of law that in 
large measure is des igned to encourage complex tax 
plann ing . Subchapter S, w ith its techn ica l and elaborate 
procedura l requ irements, is very much a part of th at 
Code. If S corporat ions are to be made usab le by a 
sign if icant number of taxpayers, Subchapter S must 
interact w ith other p rov isions of the Code and that 
interact io n w ill resu lt in dev ices that man ipu late tax 
liab ili ty. 
T he attempt to sa ni t ize Subchapter S, to iso late it from 
the tax plan ning that surrounds every other aspect of t he 
tax laws, has left Subchapter S unusab le in too many 
" PLR 8425067 (Mar. 20, 1984). 
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leg it imate contexts. On t he other hand, t he attempt has 
not been successful. Even with a high ly rest ri ctive defin i-
tion of smal l bus iness corporat ions, aven ues of tax plan-
ning, o r manipu lation, ex ist.28 The unavo idable conc lusion 
is that it is simply not poss ible to subject S corporat ions 
to a patte rn of taxatio n t hat does not ref lect the ex ist i ng 
Code if it is to be made ava ilab le to taxpayers whose 
othe r f in anc ial affa irs are fash ioned by the requ irements 
of the Code. In fact, if Congress focused upon spec ific 
potentia l abuses of Subchapter S rat her than upon over-
broad prohi bitions, those abuses could be more effec-
tive ly curta iled. 
C. Towards a Solution 
Many of the f laws in Subchapter S considered above 
could be eli minated through further d iscrete techn ica l 
amendments as has occurred repeated ly in the past. A 
mid-year elect ion proced ure, for examp le, wou ld be qu ite 
simple to enact. H istory suggests, however, that a se ri es 
of ad hoc amen d ments is not t he path to rat iona l ity. 
Moreover, g iven the present conservat ive approach to the 
def init ional provisions of Subchapter S, even simple 
prov isions tend to produce anci ll ary comp lexity . Thus, it 
was suggested above that mid-year elect ions shou ld not 
be all owed to C corporat ions un less the elect ion remained 
in effect for a prescribed pe riod-a ru le to which the 
usua l comp li cat ing exceptions would undoubted ly be 
necessary. Plain ly, broader based reform would be 
desirab le. 
When Subchapter S was or iginall y enacted in 1958 it 
was regarded with understandable suspicion by both the 
Congress that enacted it and the Treasury Department 
that admi nistered it. At the time, the eli minat ion of the 
co rporate leve l tax was a rad ica l step. What was undoubt-
ed ly viewed as a substant ial subs idy to sma ll bus iness-
today we wou ld ca ll it a preference-was to be kept 
tight ly cont ro ll ed . According ly, when Congress became 
concerned that the new condu it ent ity might be abused, it 
adopted the most rest ri ctive so lutions. 
After a quarter of a century, Subchapter S is no longer 
regarded as a pernic ious in f luence upon an otherwise 
rat ional Code; many wou ld argue that the sing le level of 
tax it produces is superior in princip le to the taxat ion of 
nonelect ing co rporat ions. Moreover, it has now become 
c lear that the restr ictive original so lut ions to feared abuse 
were both unnecessary to the protection of Subchapter S 
and harmfu l to the leg it imate use of S corporat ions. To 
date, the congress ional response to th is cha nging per-
cept ion of the S corporat ion has been both too l imited 
and inapprop ri ate ly designed. The grant of remed ial 
ruling authority in lim ited areas is not a sound substitute 
for the development of reasonab le prov isions. Rather, an 
explorat ion of the least restr ict ive alternat ives compat ib le 
w ith the object ives of Subchapter S is long overdue . 
An S corporat ion cou ld be made as f lex ible and usefu l 
a ve hic le for investment as is a pa rt nersh ip. If regular 
corporat ions, S corporat ions, trusts , and other partner-
sh ips may own interests in partnersh ips and partnerships 
can own interests in regu lar corporat ions, trusts, and 
2·0ther exa mples ex ist . Wh ile a partnership may not own an 
interest in an S co rporation, an S corporation may own an in ter-
est in a partnershi p, thu s creat ing th e potential fo r t iered conduit 
ent it ies. Recent leg islation has addressed poss ible abuses by 
t iered partnersh ips, but those restr ict ions do not app ly if th e 
parent ent ity is an S co rporation. See I. R.C. sect ion 706(d)(3) . 
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other partnerships, there is no inherent reason why a 
partnership-or a trust or a corporation-cannot own an 
interest in an S corporation. There is, however, one 
specific reason why S corporations conti nue to be re-
garded with a suspicion that has caused the Congress to 
treat them differently from other conduit entities. 
The one characteristic of the income of an S corpora-
tion that d istinguishes it from other sources of income is 
that it may be attr ibutable to the cont inued investment of 
ea rnings and profits derived by the corporation in non-
electing years. One of the most striking features of 
Subchapter S is the extreme ease of entry and exit from 
its prov isions. Wi th only the most trivial of exceptions,29 
there is no tax cost to either elect ing under Subchapter S 
or revoking that election . In pr inciple, inco me accumu-
lated during nonelect ing years remains subject to the 
same overall rate of tax as would have been imposed in 
the absence of an elect ion because even distributions by 
an S corporation out of ea rnings and profits are subject 
to a seco nd, shareholder level tax upon distribution .3o 
Howeve r, a Subchapter S election permits the income 
generated by the investment and reinvestment of those 
earn in gs to escape double taxation before those ea rnings 
and profits have been taxed at the shareholder leve l. The 
general effect of this aspect of Subc hapter S is the same 
as permitt ing the pre-election ea rnings and profits to be 
removed from co rporate so lution without the impositi on 
of tax. 
An S corporation could be made as flexible 
and useful a vehicle for investment as is a 
partnership. 
This highly favorabl e treatment of S elections by C 
corporations most clearly appears when contrasted with 
the burden of tax that would be imposed had the corpora-
tion chosen instead to form the other conduit business 
entity, a partnership . Upon the liquidation of the C 
corporation, so me ta x would be imposed at the corporate 
level.31 More signif icant ly, the shareholders would either 
be subject to tax at capital gains rates on the full va lue of 
the corporation under section 331 or an amount equal to 
the entire earnings and profits of the corporation would 
be subject to tax at ordinary rates under section 333. In 
the former event the shareho lders receive a bas is in the 
assets distributed equal to their fa ir market value; in the 
latter case the basis for the assets is substituted from the 
basis in the stock of the liquidated corporation . 
Neither tax is imposed upon the making of an S 
election. Rather, the general effect of the election is 
similar to a section 333 liquidation w ith the tax on the 
corporate earnings deferred , perhaps indef in ite ly . 
' 9E.g ., under I.R .C. section 1373(b), the making or terminating 
of an election is treated as a di sposition for the purpose of 
recaptur ing foreign losses under I.R.C. sect ion 904. 
l °I. R.C. section 1368(c)(2). 
31 Deprec iation recapture under I. R.C. sections 1245 and 1250 
overr ides th e general rule of I.R.C. section 336, as does the tax 
benefit ru le and related doctrines. See Hillsboro Nationa l Bank 
v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983). 
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Similarly, the termination of the S election does not 
involve inco me tax consequences. Whi le the incorpora-
t ion of a partnership must pass through the safeguards of 
sect ions 351 and 357, no such prov isions apply to the 
termination of the election. Thus, for example, the termi-
nation of an S election does not resu lt in a tax liability 
notwithstanding that the l iabi lities of the corporation 
exceed the basis of its assets (because losses have been 
passed through to the shareholders) while that excess 
would be subject to immediate tax upon the incorporation 
of a partne rship n 
The propriety of this freedom to move in and 
out of Subchapter S is highly questionable. 
Th e propriety of this free dom to move in and out of 
Subchapter S is highly questionable in principle and has 
opened major avenues of abuse in practice. Those possi-
bilities, in turn, have precipitated the enactment of several 
provisions in Subchapter S that are designed to prevent 
the ab use of Subchapter S by corporations. 33 And, of 
present concern, the potential presence of earnings and 
profits in an S corporation has caused Congress to re-
stri ct the availability of Subchapter S through narrow and 
technical definitional requirements. 
Congress has been willing to pay this price in sacrifice 
of principle and enhanced complexity becaU ~-; 9 it wanted t 
to make S corporation statu s freely avai lable to previous ly 
incorporated businesses. While that desire may have 
been se nsible in 1958, it may not be sBnsi ble today. Few 
corporations formed prior to 1958 wish to elect under 
Subchapter S today and those formed after that date had 
th eir opportun ity to select the form in which they desired 
to do busin ess . Th is ease of transformation may no 
longer be essential to Subchapter S. 
A st rong argument therefore exists that a corporation 
having earnings and profits accumulated during non-
electing years should not be permitted to elect under 
Subchapter S unti l those ea rnings and profits were purged 
through th e payment of an appropriate shareholder leve l 
tax. However, it is ent ire ly possible to preserve this 
generous feature of Subchapter S whi le simplifying its 
provisions for most taxpayers. 
The ex isting statutory framework already contains the 
seeds of two versions of Subchapter S. Special sect ions 
of the subchapter impose a tax upon capita l gains and 
investment income derived by an S corporation that 
prev ious ly was a C corporation. The rules govern ing 
corporate distributions apply differently depending upon 
whether the corporation has earnings and profits. And 
the regulatory treatment of the two-class-of-stock safe 
3' I. R.C. section 357(c) . 
331ncluding the corporate leve l tax on certa in cap ita l gains 
imposed by I. R.C . section 1374, the tax and invo luntary term ina-
tion rules triggered by passive income under I.R .C . sections 
1362(d)(3) and 1375, and the need for consent to elect with in five 
years of a termination required by I.R.C. section 1362(g) . 
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ha rbo r34 may we ll differ depend ing upon whether the 
corporat ion has earnings and profi ts . 
That dichotomous treatment of S co rporat ions shou ld 
be expanded to the pO int of creat ing two ent ire ly d istinct 
versions of Subchapter S. T he ex ist ing provisions simply 
attempt too much; neither corporat ions having or lack ing 
ea rn ings and prof its are def ined or taxed opt ima lly. For S 
co rporat ions hav ing earnings and prof its, the ru les of 
current law are a lready too generous; two vers ions of 
Subchapter S wou ld permit those rules to become more 
rest rictive. But of greater present importance, el imi nating 
the de ferra l of tax on earnings and prof its cou ld permit 
the development of a tru ly v iable S corporation. 
Dur ing the 1982 rev ision, Professor G insburg argued in 
these pages35 for a s im il ar approach as a vehic le for 
rationa liz ing and simp lifying the substantive provisions. 
of Subchapter S. Assum ing that it wou ld be unwise or 
unacceptab le to impose a substant ial tax burden on all 
corporations having aCGumu lated earnings and profits 
that wished to e lect under Subchapter S, he suggested 
that a simplifi ed version of S corporat ion be made ava il-
ab le to corporat ions that lacked earn ings and prof its or 
elected the imposit ion of an appropriate to ll charge as 
the price of the election. To h is observations it may be 
added that a dual Subchapter S may a lso be the on ly way 
to achieve material procedural simplif icat ion of those 
provis ions. In common w ith the substant ive taxing prov i-
sions he addressed, many of the restr ict ive def initional 
and procedura l aspects of present law are attributable to 
the ease of shift ing between Subchapters C and S by 
corporations having ea rnings and profits. Absent that 
aspect of S corporations, where would be no justificat ion 
for treating an S corporat ion more restr ict ively than other 
condu it entit ies .36 
Careful co nsiderat ion, then, should be g iven to the 
c reat ion of a category of S corporation that d id not have, 
and cou ld not obta in, earn ings and profits attributab le to 
none lecting years . If this s implified S corporat ion were 
permitted to have co rporate shareho lders, as it should 
be, it might also be necessary to bar the S corporat ion 
from obtaining property from a none lecting co rporation 
in a carryover basis transact ion. Th e definit iona l and 
procedura l requirements for such an S corporation cou ld 
be re laxed great ly. The number and catego ri es of permis-
sible sharehO ld ers cou ld be co nformed to the un l imited 
f lexibil ity granted to partnerships. As a result, the end less 
ref inemen ts o f the definitional provis ions now evolving in 
the private ruling s wo uld become unnecessary . The prohi-
bition against whol ly owned subsidi ar ies could be re-
pealed. These changes, in turn, virt ually would e liminate 
the problem of involuntary terminat ion s of Select ions. 
Other aspects of present law , such as the timing of 
elections and the one c lass of stock req uireme nt, cou ld 
be libera l ized. And , of course , the substant ive simp lifi ca-
t ions noted by Professor Ginsburg cou ld be extended to 
such a corporation. 
'·'I.R.C . sect io n 1361 (c)(5) bars treating certain debt instru-
ments as stock. Thu s, this safe harbor debt cannot be t reated as 
a second class of stock which wou ld terminate the Select ion . 
3' G insburg, Subchapter S an d Accumu lated E&P: A Different 
View, Tax Notes, November 22, 1982, p. 57 1. 
3· Perhaps ne ither S corporat ions nor partnerships should be 
ent itled to so me of the more f lex ib le features of Subc hapte r K. 
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An ex ist ing C corporation having earn ings and prof its 
could obtain the benefits of th is simpl if ied category of S 
corporation onl y by elect ing to subject its shareholders 
to a tax li ab ili ty that wou ld purge those earn ings and 
profits . Op in ions may differ on the proper level of that tax 
li abil ity. 37 Professor Ginsburg suggested that each share-
holder be taxed on an amount equal to the excess of h is 
share of the ins ide bas is for the corporate assets over the 
bas is for h is stock and that the tax be imposed at cap ita l 
ga ins rates. Such a tax wou ld approximate a tax li m ited to 
the earn ings and profits of the corporation (as under 
sect ion 333) but imposed at the preferentia l rate (as 
under section 331) and thus wou ld be far more favorab le 
than is the tax imposed at the shareholder leve l upon an 
actual li quidation . If the to ll cha rge was not to be imposed 
with respect to the entire va lue of the stock in the elect ing 
corporat ion, it wou ld be more consistent w ith the ex ist ing 
pattern of tax ing liquidat ions and other corporate d istri-
butions to impose the tax at ordinary income rates . 
Corporat ions having earnings and prof its but not elect-
ing to become sub ject to whatever tax we re ultimate ly 
determ ined appropriate wou ld, of course, remain subject 
to the more restr ict ive procedural and substantive ru les 
of present law . In fact, g iven an alternat ive S corporation 
format, som e of the accommodations of present law 
properly might be eli minated. The complex it ies of the 
qualified Subchapter S trust and of safe harbor debt 
might be repea led and the proh ib it ions against "one 
shot" elections strengthened. 
Such a dual approach to Subchapter S might f inally 
perm it the evo lution of a w idely availab le conduit corpo-
rate entity free of both the procedura l and substantive 
restr ict ions that have cr ipp led its predecessors. 
"Compare Braubach, Wi ll the Subchapte r S Revision Act 
Adequately Add ress the Issues of Accumu lated E&P and Passive 
Income?, Tax Notes, October 4,1982, p. 3. 
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